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Abstract
This paper studies the long-run eﬀect of the 2002 changeover on restau-
rant prices in Germany. German restaurant prices increased significantly
when the euro was introduced as a new currency but rather than returning
to their pre-changeover trend, restaurant prices appear to have stabilized
on a higher path. This stands in contrast to the prediction of menu costs
models or models of confusion-induced price increases as these models can
only account for a transitory eﬀect. The persistence of the increase suggests
the existence of more than one price equilibrium. This multiplicity of price
equilibria is a central part of the explanation proposed in the paper.
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Figure 1: Restaurant prices around changeover, log scale, German data. The
forecast is based on model (mv-1) of section 2.2.
1 Introduction
This paper studies the long-run eﬀect of the 2002 changeover on German restaurant
prices. The changeover’s impact is estimated by forecasting the pre-changeover
trend taking into account input prices and other variables that may aﬀect the out-
put price over the business cycle. Overall, restaurant prices are fairly predictable
and the forecast is robust to various specifications so that an extrapolation of
several years appears permissible. Figure 1 shows the actual price index and the
forecast of the paper’s baseline model over the period from 1991 to 2008.
At the changeover (denoted by the vertical line), the index leaps up by around
3.5 percent. The stability of the gap between actual and predicted series is puzzling
and documenting the gap and suggesting an explanation is subject of this paper.
Somewhat overshadowed by the leap in January 2002, restaurant price inflation
in the year before the changeover is unusually high. This and the persistence
make the menu costs explanation unlikely. Menu costs would appear a natural
explanation for the restaurant sector (Hobijn, Ravenna, Tambalotti, 2006) but
menu costs are neutral in the sense that they can only explain a jump in prices
if the jump is accompanied by periods of reduced inflation. This neutrality is not
observed in the data.
A second type of explanation for the high inflation at the changeover is that
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firms took advantage of buyers’ “confusion” with the new currency and with the
new nominal prices.1 This explanation is able to explain some of the patterns in
the data but cannot explain the persistence of the increase because after some
time, buyers should be familiar with the new prices.
A third type of explanation was suggested by Adriani, Marini, and Scaramozzino
(2009) who argue that the changeover allowed firms to coordinate on a higher price
equilibrium. In their model, restaurants and customers are matched stochastically.
The stochastic matching implies that restaurants do not compete and that there
are multiple price equilibria.
The existence of multiple equilibria would provide an explanation for the per-
sistence but they also raise the question why restaurants have not coordinated on
the higher price before and why there should be multiple price equilibria in the
restaurant sector. Below I will argue that there are several features of the restau-
rant pricing game that make multiple equilibria likely and that the answer to the
question why restaurants have not coordinated on the higher equilibrium before is
almost obvious once we are familiar with the peculiarities of restaurant pricing.
The paper contributes to the existing literature (1) by estimating the long-run
eﬀect of a currency changeover on the price of a particular sector (2) by suggesting
an explanation for why changeovers may have a persistent impact on prices.
Two words of caution are in order. First, in this paper, I study one particular
sector of one particular country and figure 1 is not necessarily representative for
the European restaurant sector as a whole. Second, estimating the long-run eﬀect
of the changeover requires a long sample and for that reason, I use a price index.
Aggregation, however, disguises the underlying heterogeneity. Evaluating their
argument about consumers’ reaction to rounding, Berardi et al. (2011) find that
in France around a fifth of restaurants rounded down. For Germany, a similar
pattern is probably to be expected. By analyzing a price index, the paper studies
the eﬀect of the changeover on the “average” German restaurant. The reason why
I focus on Germany is that the German statistical oﬃce publishes detailed data
on the restaurant sector (including restaurant specific wages).
1See for example Dziuda and Mastrobuoni (2009), Gaiotti and Lippi (2008), and Berardi,
Eife, and Gautier (2011).
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2 Forecasting Restaurant Prices
Howwould the restaurant price index look like had the changeover not taken place?
We cannot answer this question directly but we can construct hypothetical paths
using pre-changeover data - similar to an event study. As always, there remains
uncertainty about these forecasts and we have to be careful when interpreting
the results but we will see that restaurant prices are fairly predictable and the
projections are quite robust so that an extrapolation of four or five years seems
permissible.
Following the event study literature, I define the event window to be larger
than the actual event (the changeover). The reason for this is that firms may alter
their normal price setting in the months around the changeover. In order to reduce
the influence of any unusual behavior, the estimation window (the subsample I use
to forecast) is restricted to the period up to December 2000 (one year before the
changeover). Expanding the event window further, aﬀects the estimation results
only slightly.
I proceed in two steps. First, following the Box-Jenkins methodology, I use
only past values of restaurant prices to construct the forecasts. Besides providing
an easy way to produce fast and often reliable forecasts, this univariate approach
has the advantage that we can use monthly data. In a second step (subsection
2.2), I include additional explanatory variables such as wages or producer prices.
These variables are often available only quarterly. Subsection 2.3 summarizes the
findings.
2.1 Univariate Forecast
The German statistical oﬃce publishes a monthly index of restaurant prices start-
ing in January 1991. Visual inspection of the data (see figure 1) suggests that the
(logged) index is not stationary which is confirmed by an augmented Dickey Fuller
(ADF) test. An ADF test indicates that the diﬀerenced data are stationary. One
key assumption of the Box-Jenkins methodology is that the structure of the data
generating process does not change. That is, the model’s parameters should be
constant over time. Figure 1 suggests, however, a possible break around 1993. The
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index is significantly steeper before 1993 than in the rest of the estimation sample.
To test for an unknown structural break point, I start with an ARMA(1,1) model
and run a Quandt-Andrews test with 15 percent trimming. This test indicates
that May 1993 is the most likely break-point location. The variance of inflation in
both subsamples is similar.
Regarding taxes, Germany raised VAT rates three times during our sample:
January 1993 (by one percentage point), April 1998 (one percentage point) and
January 2007 (three percentage points). The first two VAT increases fall into the
estimation period and will be controlled for by two dummy variables that take the
value one at the appropriate date and zero otherwise. Firms may not be able to
pass on all the tax increase immediately so I have added more dummies covering
the months after the tax increases. These turned out to be insignificant. The third
VAT change in 2007 falls into the post-event window and needs to be taken into
account when we construct the forecasts. This is discussed in the next subsection.
The dummy for the break in May 1993 takes the value zero up to this point and
one afterwards.
Table 1 presents the baseline model (uv-1) and five other models for the ro-
bustness analysis. The baseline model, an ARMA((1 12)  1)-model, provides a
reasonable fit. As all other models in the table, this model includes two tax dum-
mies (1993:01 and 1998:04) and a dummy for the break in 1993:05. It is possible
to improve the Akaike information criterion and the Schwarz criterion by adding
other lags but in order not to overfit I have chosen the more parsimonious model.
The correlograms and the Ljung-Box Q-statistics point to no autocorrelation in
the residuals but due to outliers, the residuals of the first five models of table 1 do
not appear normally distributed. Using the studentized residual (¯) as a measure,
two observations appear influential: 1992:02 and 1994:09. In both cases |¯|  32
Model uv-6 adds two outlier dummies that take the value one at these influential
dates and zero otherwise. After adding the two outlier dummies, the residuals
appear normally distributed.
2The studentized residual is the residual at that observation divided by an estimate of its
standard deviation, ¯ = ()√1− , where  is the original residual for that observation,  () is
the variance of the residual that would have resulted had observation  not been included in the
estimation and  is the −th diagonal element of  ( 0)−1  (hat matrix).
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Figure 2: Left hand panel: forecast based on baseline model (uv-1) of univariate
forecasts with 95% confidence bands. Right hand panel: forecasts of all six models
shown in table 1. The forecasts do not take into account the VAT increase in 2007.
With ¯2 = 068, the baseline model explains the evolution of restaurant prices
over the 10-year period before the changeover reasonably well. Figure 2 shows
that the six univariate forecasts are almost identical. Figure 2 also plots confidence
bands around the baseline forecast. Adding outlier dummies in model uv-6, aﬀects
the point estimates and the forecasts only slightly but it does improve the model’s
fit. The confidence bands around the forecast of model uv-6 are significantly
narrower than the confidence bands shown in figure 2.
2.2 Multivariate Forecast
In this section, I include additional explanatory variables to construct the forecasts.
These are mainly costs factors such as wages, rents, and producer prices but also
other variables that may aﬀect restaurants’ price setting over the business cycle.
The goal of the section is, again, to understand how restaurant prices would have
evolved had the changeover not taken place. Cost factors are important as it may
well be that the gap between actual and predicted prices we found in the univariate
analysis closes once these variables are included.
An index of restaurant wages is available for Germany but unfortunately, the
series starts only in 1996 so that the sample is rather short. The German statistical
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uv-1 uv-2 uv-3 uv-4 uv-5 uv-6
constant 0.001
(0.000)
∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.000)
∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.000)
∗∗ 0.001
(0.000)
∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.000)
∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.000)
∗∗∗
AR(1) 0.409
(0.035)
∗∗∗ 0.387
(0.066)
∗∗∗ 0.423
(0.164)
∗∗ 0.450
(0.057)
∗∗∗ 0.416
(0.054)
∗∗∗ 0.443
(0.032)
∗∗∗
AR(2) 0.064
(0.086) 0.041(0.221)
AR(3) 0.003
(0.095) −0.00(0.128)
AR(4) −0.076
(0.056)
−0.081
(0.050)
−0.071
(0.059)
AR(5) 0.023
(0.052) 0.047(0.054) 0.066(0.055) 0.029(0.028)
AR(6) 0.063
(0.069) 0.046(0.069)
AR(7) 0.029
(0.076) 0.010(0.075)
AR(8) −0.131
(0.085)
−0.101
(0.074)
AR(9) 0.056
(0.071) 0.046(0.070)
AR(10) −0.027
(0.067)
0.008
(0.085)
AR(11) 0.102
(0.084) 0.019(0.094)
AR(12) 0.106
(0.025)
∗∗∗ 0.034
(0.055) 0.134(0.070)
∗ 0.094
(0.033)
∗∗∗ 0.153
(0.043)
∗∗∗ 0.098
(0.018)
∗∗∗
MA(1) −0.744
(0.108)
∗∗∗ −0.730
(0.116)
∗∗∗ −0.880
(0.271)
∗∗∗ −0.910
(0.118)
∗∗∗ −0.779
(0.073)
∗∗∗ −0.835
(0.047)
∗∗∗
MA(2) 0.122
(0.394) 0.207(0.109)
∗
MA(3) −0.00
(0.200)
MA(12) −0.220
(0.089)
∗∗ −0.221
(0.069)
∗∗∗
outlier
dummies no no no no no yes
Q (4) 1.895
[0.595] 0.931[0.818] 0.883− 1.600[0.449] 1.530[0.465] 4.025[0.259]
Q (8) 6.707
[0.460] 3.212[0.865] 2.071[0.723] 5.361[0.498] 4.533[0.605] 6.917[0.438]
Q (12) 11.180
[0.428] 3.754[0.977] 2.753[0.949] 9.497[0.486] 6.254[0.794] 11.348[0.415]
Jarque
Bera
28.85
[0.000] 18.52[0.000] 22.77[0.000] 20.89[0.000] 18.25[0.000] 2.307[0.315]
R¯2 0.68 0.67 0.68 0.69 0.70 0.74
AIC −10.66 −10.54 −10.57 −10.66 −10.71 −10.76
SI −10.48 −10.12 −10.07 −10.41 −10.49 −10.54
n. obs. 119 119 119 119 119 119
Table 1: Univariate models. Dependent variable: first diﬀerence of logged restau-
rant price (rp). Newey West standard errors in parenthesis (2 lags). ***, **, and
* indicate significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent. All models include
two tax dummies (1993:01, 1998:04) and a dummy for the break in 1993:05. Q(n)
are the Ljung-Box Q-statistics of the residual autocorrelations, p-value in brack-
ets. Jarque-Bera: test for normality of the residuals, p-value in brackets. Outlier
dummies for 1992:03, 1994:09. Sample 1991:01 - 2000:12.
oﬃce recommends using barber wages instead. The oﬃce’s argument here is that
both wages are for relatively low-skilled work in a services sector. The variable
“1” in the model below is barber wage. The series is quarterly and ends in
2008.
As robustness check, I also use wages paid in the food-processing industry
(2). The variable “3” is the short series of restaurant wage. Regarding
restaurant wages, the sample is too short to provide reliable estimates. Nonethe-
less, the data still provide information about the question whether the gap be-
tween actual and predicted prices closes once additional explanatory variables are
included. The answer is likely to be negative. Restaurant wage inflation during
the sample is around 1 percent per year, similar to barber wage inflation so that
wages do not appear to be the driving force between the increases in the output
price.
The second and third input factors considered are rents and producer prices.
For both factors, no restaurant specific data are available. Bulwien, a market
research company, publishes a yearly index of commercial rents in Germany. An
interpolation of this series is used as regressor. Note that unlike in many other
countries, rents have been declining in Germany over the past two decades. For
producer prices, the index used is an aggregate index of German producer prices
that includes food and energy.
Firms’ pricing behavior may change over the business cycle. To account for this,
gross domestic product (gdp) is included as explaining variable. Using national
income or workers’ compensation instead of gdp gives similar results. Again, two
dummies for the VAT increases in 1993 and 1998 are added. The break dummy
included in the univariate analysis is dropped as the break that occurs around
1993 is well explained by the additional variables.
Table 2 shows the estimation output of six models. All models include two
tax dummies (1993q1 and 1998q4). After adding an MA(1)-term, the residuals of
the models appear normally distributed and the correlograms and the Ljung-Box
Q-statistics point to no autocorrelation in the residuals.
Model mv-1 is the baseline model. The signs are as expected. An increase in
wage inflation increases output price inflation after some lags. A similar eﬀect is
observed for producer prices. Pricing behavior seems to change over the course of
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the business cycle with higher inflation during expansionary periods. I also added
the dependent variable lagged one and two periods to proxy for unobserved factors
whose omission may bias estimation. The dependent variable lagged two periods is
significant. Adding ∆ lagged one period leaves the point estimates of the other
variables almost unchanged. The forecasts are similar.
Model mv-4 includes rents. As mentioned above, housing rents decrease during
the estimation period explaining the negative sign. Even though rents turn out to
be significant at 10 percent, I dropped the variable from the baseline model because
of the unreasonable sign. Model mv-5 replaces barber wage with wages paid in
the food-processing sector and model mv-6 shows the estimates with restaurant
wages. Note the low F-statistic in model mv-6.
When forecasting beyond 2007, we have to take into account the 3-percent VAT
increase in January 2007. Not doing so would lead to a considerably wider gap
between actual and predicted index towards the end of the sample (see figure 2).
In the long run, we should expect firms to pass on the entire tax increase but the
data suggest that firms were not able to do so immediately. In order to estimate
the VAT increase’s impact, I run the baseline model over the entire sample adding
dummies for the event window (2001:01 - 2002:04) and dummies for the eight
quarters following the tax increase (2007:01 - 2008:04). The point estimates of
the latter dummies indicate firms’ ability to pass on the tax. The estimates (see
appendix), show that in the first quarter following the tax increase, firms were able
to pass on almost a third of the tax. After eight quarters, 98 percent of the tax
increase was passed on. The point estimates of the VAT dummies are then added
to the forecasts.
Overall, with coeﬃcients of determination of around 09, the models explain
the evolution of restaurants in the estimation period reasonably well. Compared
to the univariate models in the previous section, including additional explanatory
variables significantly improves the fit. The forecasts appear robust across diﬀerent
model specifications. The left hand panel of figure 3 plots confidence bands around
the forecast based on model mv-1. The right hand panel of the figure shows the
forecasts of all six models of table 2 in addition to the forecast of model uv-1 of the
previous section. The forecasts are multi-step, that is, the forecasts are constructed
using only information about the explanatory variables (e.g., wages or producer
9
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Figure 3: Left hand panel: forecast based on baseline model (mv-1) of multivariate
forecasts with 95% confidence bands. Right hand panel: forecasts of all six models
shown in table 2 together with forecast of model uv-1.
prices). Where the lagged dependent variable enters, previously forecasted values
for the lagged dependent variable are used in forming forecasts of the current value.
2.3 Discussion
It seems safe to draw the following conclusions from the preceding analysis. First,
restaurant prices increased significantly during the changeover and the increase
appears unrelated to costs or business cycle movements. Second, even five years
after the changeover, there is no obvious tendency of convergence. The gap between
the actual and the predicted series appears rather stable. This result is robust to
diﬀerent methodologies and diﬀerent specifications so that an extrapolation of
five years seems permissible. I have plotted forecasts over longer horizons because
they are interesting but they should be interpreted with care even if the confidence
intervals are quite narrow.
Three more points are worth mentioning. First, from a theoretical point of
view, input and output prices could be cointegrated. That is, the variables may
follow a common trend in which case the methodology used above would not be ef-
ficient. There does, however, not appear to be a cointegrating relationship between
input and output prices, which is probably due to the decline in rents. Intuitively,
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cointegration means that there is some kind of equilibrium relationship among the
variables but that, at least in our sample, no such equilibrium exists. Second, the
gap between actual and predicted prices appears to have closed somewhat during
the event window. At the time of the changeover (January 2002), actual prices
are roughly 3.5 percent higher than what is predicted by the models. Later, the
gap stabilizes at around 3 percent. Third, the high inflation in the year before the
changeover is striking. Already the first observation in the event window is outside
the confidence bands of our forecasts. This is one of the reasons that make the
menu-cost argument unlikely.
3 The Restaurant Pricing Game
In this section, I make the case for the multiple equilibria argument suggested by
Adriani et al. (2009). There are a number of models that generate multiple equi-
libria and all are plausible in certain situations but one of the questions raised by
figure 1 is, “Why restaurants?”. I begin with a short description of the restaurant
sector stressing the characteristics that I believe are important for an explanation.
The goal of this description is primarily to argue that the assumptions made in the
formal analysis below provide a reasonable description of the restaurant sector.
Years ago, when I entered university as a freshman, there was a kebab seller
asking 4 Marks for a kebab. Though not the only food outlet, kebab was popular
among students. Probably because of this popularity, another kebab seller opened
shop a couple of months later, asking 3.50 Marks for a piece. The next day, the
first had reduced its price to 3 prompting further reaction from the second. This
went on for a few days until both charged 2.50 Marks. We students, happy about
the forces of competition, were quite surprised to see both sellers asking 4 Marks
at the beginning of the following week. We never found out whether the two sellers
actually met or whether they were able to agree tacitly on the original price.
For this type of tacit (Bertrand) collusion to work, certain conditions are nec-
essary as the incentives for sellers to deviate are strong. In the following lines, I
argue that the restaurant market has a number of characteristics that facilitate
collusion.
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mv-1 mv-2 mv-3 mv-4 mv-5 mv-6
constant 00004
(00003) 00008(00002)
∗∗∗ 00004
(00004) 0000(0000) 00004(00004) 00026(00015)
∆(−1) −00001
(00445)
∆(−2) 01608
(00359)
∗∗∗ 01608
(00420)
∗∗∗ 02226
(00502)
∗∗∗ 01318
(00529)
∗∗ −03038
(02024)
∆(−1) 00146
(00197) 00230(00247) 00146(00223) 00087(00232) 00335(00283) 00279(00870)
∆(−2) 01479
(00230)
∗∗∗ 01222
(00382)
∗∗∗ 01479
(00229)
∗∗∗ 01707
(00280)
∗∗∗ 01745
(00237)
∗∗∗ 01473
(00553)
∗
∆(−1) 00638
(00179)
∗∗∗ 00458
(00211)
∗∗ 00638
(00178)
∗∗∗ 00740
(00137)
∗∗∗ 00483
(00179)
∗∗ −00662
(00683)
∆(−2) −00350
(00146)
∗∗ −00190
(00144)
−00350
(00140)
∗∗ −00338
(00153)
∗∗ −00603
(00253)
∗∗ 00271
(00619)
∆1(−1) 00479
(00171)
∗∗∗ 00455
(00178)
∗∗ 00479
(00237)
∗ 00501
(00153)
∗∗∗
∆1(−2) 00151
(00167) 00517(00221)
∗∗ 00152
(00160) −00043(00246)
∆1(−4) 00444
(00638)
∗∗∗ 00612
(00096)
∗∗∗ 00444
(00102)
∗ 00464
(00142)
∗∗∗
∆2(−1) 01014
(00800)
∆2(−2) −00733
(00564)
∆2(−4) 00998
(00410)
∗∗
∆3(−1) −00580
(01046)
∆3(−2) 00490
(00644)
∆3(−4) 00109
(00959)
∆(−1) −00232
(00128)
∗
 (4) 1788
[0618] 1510[0680] 1786[0618] 1949[0583] 3105[0376] 3088[0378]
 (8) 2608
[0919] 3310[0855] 2607[0919] 3020[0883] 4370[0736] 9965[0191]
 (12) 4339
[0959] 5649[0896] 4338[0959] 5132[0925] 5453[0907] 21110[0032]
¯2 0920 0903 0916 0923 0908 0610
F-statistic 3645∗∗∗ 325∗∗∗ 320∗∗∗ 338∗∗∗ 316∗∗∗ 303
S.E. of Reg. 00013 00014 00013 00012 00014 00016
n.obs. 35 35 35 35 35 14
Table 2: Multivariate models. Dependent variable: first diﬀerence of restaurant
price (rp). Newey West standard errors in parenthesis (2 lags). *** indicates
signifiance at one percent, ** at five, and * at ten percent. All models include
tax dummies for 1993q1 and 1998q2 and an MA(1) term. Q(n) are the Ljung-Box
Q-Statistics of the residual autocorrelations, p-values in brackets. Note the low
F-statistic of model mv-6. Sample 1991:01 - 2000:04, quarterly data.
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In general, restaurants are price (not quantity) setters and the decision by one
restaurant (say, to enter the market or to raise prices) has a direct eﬀect on the
demand of its neighboring restaurants whose number is probably not very large.
Most restaurants enter a market for a longer period of time so that any in-
teraction between them can be considered “repeated”. The interaction is helped
by two factors. First, regulations in many countries (including Germany) require
restaurants to post prices well visible from outside the establishment. These re-
quirements are intended to assist consumers but increase price transparency among
competitors as well. Secret price cuts are diﬃcult to imagine. Second, restaurant
prices are rigid. On average, restaurants keep prices constant for between 12 and 24
months (Altissimo et al. 2006). Both the rigidity and the regulatory requirements
make price setting in the restaurant sector highly transparent.
The nature of the product also helps collusion. Scherer (1980, p. 220) argues
that profitable tacit collusion is most likely when orders are “small, frequent and
regular”. A description that nicely matches restaurants meals. In addition, sub-
stitutability is reasonably high. Naturally, a chef would never admit that he is
producing a homogeneous product, but from the point of view of a customer, it is
in most cases fairly easy to find substitutes.3
Summing up, the restaurant sector may be described as a market of (local)
oligopolies in which firms compete in a repeated Bertrand manner. In addition, the
market has a number of characteristics that are typically considered as facilitating
collusion.
Collusion and the resulting multiplicity of equilibria is, however, not suﬃcient
for an explanation as it begs the question why restaurants have not coordinated
on the higher price before. The answer, I argue, is pricing points. Restaurants
typically set prices at pricing points (also called attractive or threshold prices),
such as 400 Euros for a kebab. The tendency to set prices at discrete intervals
reduces the number of potential equilibrium prices and implies that at the firm
3Restaurant meals are a classic example of experience goods, that is, goods whose attributes
can be determined only after purchase or during consumption (Nelson 1970). This characteristic
is important for the study of the buyer-seller relationship but less important for the study of
seller-seller relationship which is our concern here.
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level, real prices will change during a changeover as some pricing points disappear
and new ones come about.
Consider again the example of the two kebab sellers above. Converting this
price at the oﬃcial exchange rate of 195853 Marks per Euro yields a price of
around 204 Euros. If the firm prefers round prices, it can either round up or down
to the next attractive price. Rounding down to 200 implies a price reduction of
more than 2 percent and rounding up to 210 implies a price increase of almost 3
percent. The important point here is that a price change from, say 204 to 200 is
a change from a price that, due to the changeover, lost its equilibrium status to a
price that only gained an equilibrium status with the changeover. In other words,
a price of 200 Euros was not feasible before the changeover.
The formal analysis starts in the next section with the two polar cases of a
monopoly and of a model of static Bertrand competition. Section 3.2 turns to
a model of repeated Bertrand competition that I argue is a good description of
the restaurant sector. There we will see that pricing points may both facilitate
and hinder collusion and that in such an environment a changeover may lead to
persistently higher prices.
3.1 Monopoly and static Bertrand competition
This section discusses the two polar cases of monopoly and (static) Bertrand com-
petition. Note that the discussion about pricing points is analogous to the integer
problem that arises when there is a smallest unit of account.
Let  be a firm’s price and suppose that prices have to be named in some
discrete multiple of ∆ the “unit of payment”. If, for example, prices are multiples
of 50 cents (such as 350 or 400) we have ∆ = 50. We can then express round
prices in terms of ∆ as
∆ ≤  ≤ ∆ ( + 1)
for some  ∈ N with one inequality strict. It is sometimes convenient to use a
more general notation for pricing points. Let the ceiling (floor) function denote a
price that is rounded up (down). A rounded price is indicated by square brackets
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so that
[] =
⎧
⎨
⎩
de = ∆ ( + 1) if the firm rounds up
bc = ∆ if the firm rounds down.
The changeover alters the unit of payment. Instead of multiples of ∆, let the
new unit be Γ, where Γ may be larger or smaller than ∆.4 Prices are then given
by
Γ ≤  ≤ Γ (+ 1)
for some  ∈ N, again, one inequality strict. Where necessary, subscripts indicate
whether a price is denoted in the new or the old currency, such as
[]Γ or []∆ 
I also assume that the unit of account is suﬃciently small so that there are enough
pricing points to assure that firms can always round up and down. This is to
exclude cases where, say, a monopolist cannot round down because the lower price
happens to be below marginal costs.
Consider first the case of a monopolist producing a single good whose constant
average (and marginal) costs are equal to . Let market demand be given by a
strictly decreasing function  (·) and let  be the price that maximizes profits,
 = argmax≥0  () 
where  () = (− ) () are the firm’s profits.
4The relationship between ∆ and Γ is not necessarily given by the actual conversion rate as
firms may decide to use diﬀerent intervals (say, multiples of 10 instead of 50). Firms’ choice is,
however, restricted if the unit of payment reaches the unit of account (e.g., one cent). This is
ruled out here.
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The figure illustrates firm’s rounding. The monopolist will round up when
 (bc)   (de) (1)
and round down if the inequality sign is reversed. When the profit function () is
symmetric around , price decreases and price increases are equally likely.
A changeover leaves  unaﬀected so the decision to round up or down is as
well given by equation (1) and, unless we assume that the profit function is skewed,
price increases and price decrease are equally likely.
Now consider the Bertrand model of oligopolistic competition in which prices
are the firms’ strategic variables and where the individual firms  ∈ {1 2  }
set their respective price  simultaneously. Suppose that the good produced by
every firm is homogeneous and its aggregate market demand is given by a strictly
decreasing function  (·)  Assume that firms display an identical (linear) cost
function with constant average (and marginal) cost being equal to . In case of
equal prices, a demand sharing rule is applied.5
Unlike in the case of a monopolist where imposing pricing points leads to both
increases and decreases, firms competing in Bertrand manner will always round
up when forced to set prices at pricing points and make equilibrium profits.
Proposition 1 In the Bertrand model of price competition with pricing points,
there is a unique Nash equilibrium in which all firms charge de  .
Proof. Note first that all firms get a strictly positive profit by using this strategy.
No firm wants to raise its price. If one of them did so, its sales would be zero
and it would make zero profit. No firm wants to lower its price because if one
of them would lower its price to at least bc, it would make non-positive profits
since bc ≤ . Therefore, given that the other firms charge de, charging de is the
unique best response.
A changeover leaves  unaﬀected. The decision to raise or lower prices depends
5We may allow firms to set diﬀerent prices in equilibrium if consumers adjust prices by other
factors such as quality. For example, if consumers care about the price-quality ratio, equilibrium
requires that  =  for two firms  and .
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on which pricing point is closer to . That is, a firm would raise its price if
deΓ  de∆
and lower its price if the inequality sign is reversed.
3.2 Repeated Bertrand Competition
Consider now a situation in which firms compete for sales repeatedly, with com-
petition in each period  described by the Bertrand model above. When setting
prices, the firms know all the prices that have been chosen (by all firms) previ-
ously. There is a discount factor   1, and each firm  attempts to maximize the
discounted value of profits
P∞
=1 −1.
Consider the following Nash reversion strategy in which firm ’s strategy spec-
ifies what price  it will charge in each period  as a function of the history of all
past price choices by its rivals, −1 = {1  }−1=0. That is,
 (−1) =
(
[] if either  = 1 or if all  elements of −1 equal [] or
de otherwise.
(2)
This strategy calls for the firm to initially play the monopoly price [] in
period 1. Then, in each period   1, firm  plays [] if in every previous period
all  firms have charged price [] and otherwise charges a price equal to the lowest
feasible price de. In other words, firms cooperate until someone deviates and any
deviation triggers a permanent retaliation. A firm that wants to deviate needs
to lower prices by at least ∆. Let the rounded monopoly price be [] = ∆,
then the highest price a deviating firm can set equals b[]c = ∆ ( − 1)  The
following proposition states that if firms follow the strategy in (2), then all firms
will end up charging the (rounded) monopoly price in every period.
Proposition 2 The strategies described in (2) constitute a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium of the infinitely repeated game if
1
1− 
1
 
 (b[]c)
 ([])−  (de)  (3)
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Proof. A set of strategies is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of an infinite
horizon game if and only if it specifies Nash equilibrium play in every subgame.
Although each subgame of this repeated game has a distinct history of play leading
to it, all of these subgames are identical to the game as a whole. Thus, to establish
that the strategies in (2) constitute a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, we need
to show that after any previous history of play, the strategies specified for the
remainder of the game constitute a Nash equilibrium of an infinitely repeated
Bertrand game. In fact, we only need to be concerned with two types of previous
histories: those in which there has been a previous deviation and those in which
there has been no deviation.
First, consider a subgame after a deviation has occurred. Then we are in the
case of proposition (1) where each firm makes positive profits of 1 (de) and
setting  = de is a Nash equilibrium. The discounted value of these profits equals
1
1− 
1
 (de) 
Suppose now that up to period , no deviation has occurred and that firm
 contemplates deviating from price [] in period . In order to maximize its
payoﬀs, the firm will set the highest feasible price below the rounded monopoly,
that is, b[]c. In the periods after the firm deviates (+ 1 + 2 ), the strategies
call for firm ’s rivals to charge a price de.
On the other hand, if the firm never deviates, it earns a discounted payoﬀ of
1
1− 
1
 ([
]) 
Thus, a firm would not deviate as long
1
1− 
1
 (de) +  (b[
]c)  1
1− 
1
 ([
]) 
Rearranging yields the required result.
This result is a version of a well-known formalization of tacit collusion. The
interesting facet of this formalization is that collusion is enforced through a purely
noncooperative mechanism. To get some intuition for this result note first that the
right hand side of equation (3) approaches 1 as ∆→ 0. In this case, we are back
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in the familiar result without pricing points. Also note that the right hand side of
equation (3) may be smaller or larger than one. That is, pricing points may both
hinder and facilitate collusion. Pricing points hinder collusion in that the harshest
punishment the strategy can call for still involves positive profits since de  .
But if on the other hand  (de) is small, pricing points facilitate collusion because
in order to deviate, a firm must lower prices by at least ∆
A high discount factor () and a small number of firms () facilitate collusion.
The discount factor need not be interpreted literally. Suppose, for example, that
in each period there is a probability  that the firms’ interaction might end. In
this case, the discount factor in equation (3) would be replaced by  = 0, for
some other discount factor 0 ∈ (0 1). The higher the probability that the game
continues, the more likely is collusion. This interpretation makes clear that the
infinitely repeated game framework is relevant even when firms compete only for
some finite amount of time. What is needed to fit the analysis into the framework
above is a strictly positive probability of continuing the game. The discount factor
may also be interpreted as a measure of the time it takes to detect a deviation.
The longer it takes to detect a deviation, the lower .
The following corollary states the well-known result that in infinitely repeated
games of this type, there is a profusion of possible equilibria.
Corollary 3 In the infinitely repeated Bertrand game, with condition (3) satisfied,
any price  ∈ [de  []] can be supported as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
using Nash reversion strategies.
For the proof, simply replace [] by any  ∈ [de  []] in the proof of propo-
sition (1) above. This profusion of equilibria can be judged either positively or
negatively. Positively, one may emphasize the fact that these results often allow
game-theoretic models to recover the consistency with empirical observations that
is lost when the situation is analyzed as a static game as in proposition (1). There,
the only equilibrium was to set the lowest feasible price de and competition be-
tween only two firms is enough to assure the perfect competitive outcome. On the
negative side, however, it is often stressed that this very “success” sometimes does
away with the usefulness of the approach. The models do not have much explana-
tory power if they are compatible with a whole range of diﬀerent outcomes. In our
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case where prices are set at discrete pricing points, the profusion is lower than in
the standard case but, of course, the range of possible equilibria is not necessarily
smaller.
I finally turn to the changeover whose eﬀect is summarized in the following
corollary.
Corollary 4 In the infinitely repeated Bertrand game with pricing points in which
firms coordinated on some price  ∈ [de  b[]c), rounding up dominates rounding
down.
For the proof, note that the profit function is strictly increasing between de
and b[]c, giving the result. If the firms already set the monopoly price, [],
we are back in the monopoly case of section 3.1 and both rounding up and down
may be optimal. The mechanism, thus, requires that there are firms that price
below the monopoly price. Here it is important to remember that the changeover
occurred in a period of positive inflation. The monopoly price is, therefore, not
constant but varies over time so that the requirement that some firms are pricing
below [] appears innocuous.
4 Discussion
This paper estimates the long-run eﬀect of the 2002 currency changeover on Ger-
man restaurant prices and shows (1) that restaurant prices increased significantly
during the changeover and that the increase is unrelated to costs or business cycle
movements. (2) Several years after the changeover, there is no obvious tendency of
convergence. The gap between the actual and the predicted series is rather stable.
The explanation suggested has to elements, multiple equilibria and pricing
points. I argued first that restaurants compete in a repeated Bertrand fashion
and that the sector has several characteristics that facilitate collusion. Collusion
allows firms to coordinate on a price above marginal costs. The second element,
pricing points, explains why firms have not coordinated on the higher price before.
Pricing points restrict the number of potential equilibria and a changeover disturbs
the original set of equilibria and forces firms to raise or lower prices. In such an
environment, rounding up is optimal as long firms price below the monopoly price.
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Though I believe that the assumptions made above are reasonable and the ex-
planation plausible, I want to make one qualification in this concluding discussion.
From a theoretical point of view, it is as well conceivable that there are incentives
not to round up. Berardi et al. (2011), for example, argue that consumers may
be put oﬀ when a firm increase prices at the changeover and reduce demand. By
lowering prices, on the other hand, a seller may be able to attract new customers.
If this eﬀect is strong enough, a firm may find it optimal to lower prices.
Graphically, this eﬀect causes the profit function to pivot around the original
price. For our case, this argument is interesting because - similar to the two polar
cases of section 3.1 - consumers’ behavior creates again a kind of “anchor” that
is unaﬀected by the changeover and we may observe price reductions even if firms
price below the monopoly price.
This paper focuses on the restaurant sector but many of characteristics of the
restaurant sector that facilitate collusion are as well typical for other services such
as dry cleaning or hair dressing and it is possible that we find a similar eﬀect in
these sectors as well. I leave this for future research.
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Appendix
Data Description All variables are in logs. Source: German statistical oﬃce,
except commercial rents.
•  : index of restaurant prices, monthly, 1991M1 - 2010M12.
•  : commercial rents, annual data 1991 - 2010, source: BulwienGesa
•  : gross domestic product, quarterly, 1991q1 - 2010q4, seasonally adjusted.
— national income, quarterly, 1991q1 - 2010q4, seasonally adjusted.
— workers’ compensation quarterly, 1991q1 - 2010q4, seasonally adjusted.
•  : producer prices, monthly, 1991q1 - 2010q4, seasonally adjusted.
• 1 : wages paid in barber sector, quarterly, 1991q1 - 2008q4.
• 2 : wages paid in the food-processing sector, quarterly, 1991q1 - 2008q4.
• 3 : wages paid in restaurant sector, quarterly, 1996q1 - 2008q4.
Percentage of 2007 VAT Increase Passed on to Consumers The table
shows the (scaled) point estimates of the eight dummies described in the text.
Quarter Point Estimates VAT passed on to buyers (accumulated)
2007q1 831 − 03 278%
2007q2 905 − 03 303%
2007q3 972 − 03 326%
2007q4 126 − 02 421%
2008q1 166 − 02 557%
2008q2 177 − 02 594%
2008q3 230 − 02 776%
2008q4 283 − 02 978%
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